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Executive Summary
The inclusion of numerous foreign components and technologies m a wide range of US military weapon 
systems a surprising fact to many has become the focus of increasing scrutiny Aircraft tanks ships 
missiles satellites and communications equipment operated by the US armed forces all contain components 
purchased overseas Procuring foreign components for use in military systems is m several respects 
beneficial—it takes advantage of the world s best technology pnces and quality In addition foreign 
procurement fosters cooperative international networks
At the same time however foreign procurement potentially renders the United States vulnerable to its 
suppliers—mostly US allies—who could cut off or delay delivery of components in pursuit of their own 
national interests While the United States has never been harmed by such vulnerabilities it encountered several 
close calls” during the recent Persian Gulf War—if news accounts are correct In addition the United States has 
m the past exploited similar vulnerabilities m dealing with its allies
Compounding vulnerability is a lack of knowledge about the true extent of foreign procurement This lack 
of knowledge is the result of incomplete data collection A dwindling manufacturing base within the United 
States also increases the likelihood that foreign procurement and its associated vulnerabilities are perpetuated 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is a relatively insignificant buyer within the overall US manufacturing base 
and cannot, on its own implement effective policies for reversing this trend. The strategic indifference of a free 
market economy coupled with inconsistent policies and uncoordinated agencies within the US government 
further perpetuates this trend
The policy implications of such pervasive and beneficial but risky foreign procurements are multifaceted 
One benefit—access to the world s best technologies for incorporation into technically superior weapon 
systems—is an essential element of US military strategy For strategic military reasons then policy makers 
should not limit procurement to domestic sources
Instead policy should focus upon taking advantage of this essential benefit of foreign procurement while at 
the same time mitigating factors that make the United States vulnerable To preclude planning in the dark 
the United States must obtain greater knowledge of the extent to which foreign components are used in its 
weapon systems An expanded database containing information about components procured at all levels of the 
supplier network is essential to determine where vulnerability is greatest Once identified, risks can be mitigated 
by proliferating suppliers and establishing stockpiles of critical components
To minimize the likelihood that vulnerabilities associated with foreign procurement might someday become 
unmanageable policy making must also focus upon reversing the decime of the US industrial base Future 
military capabilities are dependent upon having competitive domestic industries that produce the components 
DOD needs for its weapon systems The US government should identify critical industries and then mvest 
government funds m them to enhance future productivity Strategic industrial planning including review and 
revision of existing policies that negatively impact industry is also necessary
A viable plan for enhancing US industry and mitigating the vulnerabilities presented by foreign 
procurements requires more than just DOD it requires jointness —close cooperation and coordination between
1 This paper was written during the spring of 1991 while the author was assigned to the University of Illinois at Urbana
Champaign Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security The views expressed in this paper are those 
of the author alone and should not be construed as official posiuons of the Department of Defense US Air Force or any other 
governmental agency
11
government and industry A single joint organization including representatives from several executive branch 
agencies along with liaisons from Congress and the commercial manufacturing sector would be a useful 
mechanism for setting industrial priorities and establishing reasonable compromises currently non-existent 
within the US government Under the leadership of an individual with clear and broad Presidential authority a 
jomt organization would focus policies concerning industrial affairs and future foreign procurement toward US 
national interests In this manner US policy could become more responsive to trends and needs demonstrated by 
the current pervasive procurement of foreign components for use m US weapons systems
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Introduction
The inclusion of numerous foreign components and technologies m a wide range of US military weapon 
systems a surprising fact to many has become the focus of increasing scrutiny Aircraft, tanks ships 
missiles satellites and communications equipment operated by the US armed forces all contain components 
purchased overseas Procuring foreign components for use in military systems is m several respects 
beneficial—it takes advantage of the world s best technology pnces and quality In addiuon foreign 
procurement fosters cooperative international networks
At the same time however foreign procurement potentially renders the United States vulnerable to its 
suppliers—mostly US allies—who could cut off or delay delivery of components in pursuit of their own 
national interests While the United States has never been harmed by such vulnerabilities it encountered several 
close calls” during the recent Persian Gulf War—if news accounts are correct In addiuon the United States has 
in the past exploited similar vulnerabilities in dealing with its allies
Compounding vulnerability is a lack of knowledge about the true extent of foreign procurement This lack 
of knowledge is the result of incomplete data collection A dwindling manufacturing base within the United 
States also mercases the likelihood that foreign procurement and its associated vulnerabilities are perpetuated 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is a relatively insignificant buyer within the overall US manufacturing base 
and cannot on its own implement effective policies for reversing this trend. The strategic indifference of a free 
market economy coupled with inconsistent policies and uncoordinated agencies within the US government 
further perpetuates this trend
This paper examines the policy implications of such pervasive and beneficial but nsky foreign 
procurement practices The analysis attempts to ascertain whether the nsks of foreign procurement outweigh its 
benefits Ultimately the paper recommends policies that would be responsive to current trends and needs
Pervasive Nature of Foreign Procurement
Procuring components from foreign sources for use within the DOD is a relatively recent phenomena Few if 
any weapon systems in the military forces of the United States during the mid 1970s contained foreign 
components During the past fifteen years however procurement from foreign sources has accelerated rapidly 
According to a recent study at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) the percentage of import 
penetration increased in 104 out of 122 critical defense sectors during the 1980s In the components and 
subassemblies sector import penetration had reached 19 percent by the end of the decade 2
1 This paper was written dunng the spring of 1991 while the author was assigned to the University of Illinois at Urbana
Champaign Program m Arms Control Disarmament and International Security The views expressed in this paper are those 
of the author alone and should not be construed as official positions of the Department of Defense US Air Force or any other 
governmental agency
2. Testimony of James Blackwell US Congress House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs
Internationalization o f the Aerospace Industry Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization 101st 
Congress first session 10 May 1989 (Washington DC US Government Printing Office 1989 Serial No 101 23) 25 26 
Detailed information also available in James Blackwell Project Director Co-chairmen Senator Jeff Bingaman and Senator 
John McCain Deterrence in Decay the Future o f  the US Defense Industruil Base The Final Report o f  the CSIS Defense 
Industrial Base Project (Washington DC Center for Strategic and International Studies May 1989) 36-38
The overwhelming presence of foreign components m US weapon systems is documented in existing 
studies and literature A sampling of citations demonstrates this phenomena
The US defense industry is now heavily if not totally dependent on foreign sources for computer 
memory chips silicon for high powered electronic switching gallium arsenide based semiconductors 
for high speed data processing precision glass for reconnaissance satellites and other military 
equipment, liquid crystal and luminous displays and advanced fiber optics3
Semiconductors from foreign sources are contained in Global Positioning Satellites the 
Integrated Underwater Surveillance System Defense Satellite Communications System Fleet Satellite 
Communications System AN 53B SSQ Sonobuoy the F 16 Fighting Falcon AM 6988 Poet Decoy 
(an expendable jammer) the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (OH 58 Kiowa) APG 63 
Airborne Radar (for the F 15 Eagle) M l Abrams Tank and the F/A 18 Hornet4
A recent article in the Chicago Tribune reported that Japanese made technologies are in night 
viewing equipment air speed acceleration indicators infrared missile homing devices television tubes 
in aircraft cockpits microwave weapons control and targeting systems flat panel displays advanced 
radiation communications equipment submarine sensors and video display terminals *
In perhaps the most extensive study ever accomplished on procurement of foreign components 
researchers found numerous specific instances of using overseas sources for US precision guided 
missiles (PGMs) in 1987 Integrated circuit parts for all PGMs were assembled in East Asia. Radar 
components in PGMs were found to contain silicon field effect transistors (FETs) and gallium arsenide 
FETs from Japan femte cores from Germany and radome chemicals from Mexico Rocket motor 
cases for the Skipper HARM and Harpoon missiles were obtained through sources m the United 
Kingdom (and Australia in the case of the Harpoon) The United Kingdom also provided copper based 
printed wmng board plating bath actuator motors and gear motors for the HARM It also produced 
ball screws for the Patriot Australia provided extrusions for the Harpoon Switzerland produced 
copper preform for the Copperhead missile and sapphire for the Standard Patriot Mavenck,and 
Sidewinder missiles Butan tnol (used m making rocket fuel mixtures) for the Standard Patriot, 
Mavenck and Sidewinder came from Germany The HARM Sidewinder and Maverick missiles 
contained precision optics also procured from Germany as well as Japan Castings for the Standard 
missile and the launch tube for the Stinger missile were produced in Israel Finally the study found 
that molybdenum foil for the Patriot came from Austria.6
The American Gear Manufacturers Association estimated 30 percent of defense contracts for gears 
are awarded to foreign sources Over twenty four ships built between 1983 and 1989 were equipped 
with gear drives from German or British companies Significant portions of aircraft gearing are 
provided by Japanese and North European sources Vehicular gearing comes increasingly from the 
Asian basin and the Mediterranean states 7
The US Navy purchases spare parts from various European sources engine parts for a search and 
rescue ship come from Great Britain Germany supplies diesel engme parts for a patrol coastal missile
3 Jacques S Gansler Affording Defense (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1989) 271
4 John T Correli, Lifeline in Danger Air Force Magazine 71 (November 1988) 76
5 Ronald & Yales Japan Claims Big Role m US Weapons Success Chicago Tribune 3 February 1991 7 1
6. Martin Libido, Jack Nunn and Bill Taylor US Industrial Base Dependence/Vulnerability Phase II—Analysis (Washington
DC National Defense University Mobihzauon Concepts Development Center Institute for National Strategic Studies 
November 1987) Detailed discussion of this study can also be found in Martin C Libido Industrial Strength Defense A 
Disquisition on Manufacturing Surge and War (Washington DC National Defense University Mobilization Concepts 
Development Center Institute for National Strategic Studies 1988) A table summarizing several details about the 
components procured overseas for PGMs can be found on page 94 of this book
7 Testimony by Richard B Normern Executive Director and Thomas H Lowry President, American Gear Manufacturers
Association US Congress House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Defense Production Act Amendments 
o f  1989 H Jt 486 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabdization 101 st Congress first session 17 18 24 
May and 20 June 1989 (Washington DC US Government Printing Office 1989 Serial No 101 27) 5 140
hydrofoil ship and hull mechanical and electrical equipment for a coastal minesweeper are procured 
from Italy8
During the Persian Gulf War several US defense contractors requested rush delivery from 
foreign companies for components used m military equipment Japanese producers of semiconductors 
video display terminals (for analyzing real time intelligence data from reconnaissance planes) and 
lottery packs to power command and control computers received such requests France provided 
transistors for a Teledyne Corporation transponder for Identification of Friend or Foe uses In addition 
both France and Japan rushed electronic components for measuring and calibrating equipment Finally 
Great Britain surged production of radio gear and avionics for use m US weapon systems 9
The appendix to this essay details further revelations about the extent of foreign components already in US 
weapon systems as reported m the literature and in studies examined by this author As demonstrated by the 
brief listing above foreign components pervasively constitute both the critical brain cells 10 and the essential 
mechanical parts of many US weapons Today components procured from foreign sources are substantially 
embedded”11 m weapon systems across the DOD force structure
Tins trend toward foreign procurement is continuing In April 1991 Groupement Industriel des Armements 
Terrestres (GIAT) of France won a contract to supply the gun turrets for the latest US Army light helicopter12 
Great interest has been demonstrated m new Japanese components that have military applications A recent 
demonstration of the SSMI a ground based anti ship missile developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
reportedly impressed DOD officials13 The Chicago Tribune also reported that Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney visited Japan m 1990 with a shopping list for Japanese equipment and technology
Keiko s advanced missile guidance system (a shoulder fired surface to-air missile which is claimed 
to outperform the Stinger
Carbon dioxide lasers to blind enemy aircraft and satellites 
Ceramic engine components for two thousand mile per hour aircraft,
Advanced aircraft wing technology and
Third generation tank armor which is incorporated into Japan s T 90 heavy battle tank and is 
claimed to be able to withstand direct hits by most anti tank weapons currently in use 14
Mechanisms are currently being considered to rent or facilitate importation of actual Japanese weapons 
according to Charles H Ferguson a postdoctoral research associate at the Center for Technology Policy and 
Industrial Development at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 15 Such mechanisms are significant 
because m the past, Japanese laws have prohibited export of weapons While the United States depends heavily 
on Japanese imports for use m its weapon systems these have been dual use items such as semiconductors 
and optics components that have both military and commercial applications If such obstacles are overcome it 
is likely that the US military m its pursuit of a force structure technologically superior to all other military 
forces will mercase its procurement of Japanese components
8 Christopher D Dementi Commander USN and Commander Geoffrey K. Renard USN “Navy Dependence on Foreign
Spares—A Problem?" Executive Research Project #S 16 Fort McNatT (Washington DC Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces 1987) 6 7
9 Stuart Auerback US Relied on Foreign Made Parts for Weapons Washington Post 25 March 1991 1
10 British defense analyst Graham McCarty quoted by Yates “Japan Claims Big Role in US Weapons Success 7 1
11 This term was used by a civil servant within DOD during a non attribution interview in January 1991
12 French Win US Helicopter Gun Deal London Financuil Tunes 10 Apnl 1991 4
13 “Japan s Weapons Makers Ready and Able The Economist 318 (2 February 1991) 67
14 Yates Japan Claims Big Role in US Weapons Success 7-6
15 Charles H Ferguson America s High Tech Decime ” Foreign Policy 74 (Spring 1989) 183
4Benefits of Foreign Procurement
Greater availability of superior technology is one benefit of procuring foreign components As the Office of 
Technology Assessment writes high technology is a worldwide enterprise The United States no longer 
has a monopoly on it 16 In 1989 DOD began publishing listings of critical technologies for its future weapon 
systems The most recent list contains twenty one item s17 It has been estimated by various sources that the 
United States is no longer dominant in one quarter to one half the technologies in this listing 18
By buymg abroad the United States has been able to incorporate the world s best technologies and 
components into its weapon systems Numerous US weapon systems containing foreign components 
performed admirably during the Gulf War Several of these systems are conspicuous in the list contained in the 
previous section
It is essential that the best technologies continue to be incorporated m US weapon systems if the United 
States is to mam tarn its warfighting edge in an economical manner For the foreseeable future it is likely that 
wars fought by the United States will be optional —fought not to protect home soil but to rescue 
governments or nations under threat or to respond to aggression in areas of perceived vital interests19 In such 
wars two strategic concerns for the country are US casualties20 and non combatant (civilian) casualties of the 
enemy These strategic concerns necessitate precise and effective offensive action by US armed forces Conflict 
must be quick decisive and to some extent surgical Only weapon systems containing the world s most 
superior components and technologies (combined with superior personnel and training) can enable the armed 
forces of the United States to fight in this manner
Continued procurement from sources around the world also mam tains US access to technologies that are 
available to other nations including enemies either on the open market or through clandestine means 21 If an 
enemy can purchase or otherwise obtain leading technology higher in quality than that available in the United 
States then there is potential for harm to US military security At the least, access to and application of 
superior technologies by an enemy would hinder the United States when fighting under those circumstances it is 
most likely to encounter over the next several decades Thus access to the best technology is a significant 
benefit to procuring components for DOD weapon systems from foreign sources
16 US Congress Office of Technology Assessment Holding the Edge Maintaining the Defense Technology Base (Washington 
DC US Government Printing Office Apnl 1989 Señal No OTA ISC 420) 14
17 The twenty one critical technologies contained in the May 1991 DOD Critical Technologies Plan include semiconductor 
materials and microelectronic circuits software producibility parallel computer architectures machine intelligence and 
robotics simulation and modeling photonics sensitive radars passive sensors signal processing signature control 
weapon system environment, data fusion computational fluid dynamics air breathing propulsion pulsed power 
hypervelocity projectiles high energy density materials composite matenals superconductivity biotechnology materials 
and processes and flexible manufacturing
18 Theodore H Moran for instance wrote of foreign competitors taking the lead m more than a quarter” of the critical defense 
technnlngn»« The Globalization of America s Defense Industnes Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence ” 
International Security 15 (Summer 1990) 93 An Apnl 1991 CBS 60 Minutes segment reported that the US has lost 
competitiveness m ten of the (then twenty) technologies Yet another source SDI Monitor reports that “the Soviets are on 
par with the US m the areas of weapon system environment hypervelocity projectiles and high energy density matenals 
They also have a “significant lead in some areas of pulsed power With respect to US allies “Both NATO and Japan are 
capable of making some contnbuuons in sensitive radars passive sensors signal processing signature control 
hypervelocity projectiles and pulsed power In addition Sweden could make some contnbutions to sensitive radar and 
passive sensors as could Israel which also could make some contnbution to data fusion research NATO could make major 
contnbutions to the weapon system environment research high energy density materials and composite materials Japan 
could make major contnbutioi s m both matenals categones and is significantly ahead of the Umted States m 
superconductivity semiconductor matenals and microelectronic circuits Israel could make significant contnbutions m 
composite matenals and Switzerland could do the same for superconductivity Reported m article entitled “DOD Wants $16 
Billion for Cntical Technology 13 Apnl 1990 93
19 Colonel John Warden Deputy Director for Warfighting Concepts Headquarters USAF “Airpower Employment in the Future 
World speech presented in conjunction with conference entitled The Umted States Air Force Aerospace Challenges and 
Missions in the 1990s (Cambndge MA 3 Apnl 1991)
20 US casualties as a strategic concern was desenbed by a high ranking Pentagon official during a “non-attnbution session in 
January 1991
21 Uibirln, Nunn and Taylor US Industrial Base Dependence/Vulnerabdtty Phase II—Analysis 111
5Besides access to the most advanced technology procurement from foreign sources brings several other 
benefits to DOD and the United States Among these are quality control and pnce Martin Libido a researcher 
in the detailed PGM study mentioned previously found several instances of contracts awarded to overseas 
producers based on inability of domestic producers to meet required quality control standards particularly where 
matenal punty matters He cited ferrites silicon field effect transistors and integrated circuit matenal 
packaging as examples where Southeast Asian countnes (especially Japan) produced better quality components 
His study also found some components—gallium arsenide field effect transistors glass bearings and assembly 
of integrated circuits for example—could be purchased significantly cheaper overseas 22
Other studies have also emphasized the pnce advantages of components obtained through procurement 
overseas In a study sponsored by the CSIS project director James Blackwell reported that one US aerospace 
contractor pursued significant increases in its foreign supplier base as a means of reducmg costs for manufacture 
and assembly of a high technology aircraft Of thirty two hundred suppliers for its aircraft, the contractor 
expanded the foreign supplier base from 194 in 1985 to 263 in 1987 m an effort to promote cost efficiency 23 A 
US Navy study m the 1980s found that a Spanish company could produce anchor chains significantly cheaper 
than the sole US manufacturer The navy thus awarded anchor chain contracts to the Spanish company in a 
cost reduction effort although it also continued limited procurements from the sole US source 24
One additional example further demonstrates the cost/pnce advantages sometimes obtained from overseas 
suppliers In some cases the volume of DOD purchases has been so small that domestic manufacturers have 
been unable to attain economies of scale—enough production to be profitable for the manufacturer or cost 
effective for DOD As John A Richards Director of the Commerce Department s Office of Industrial Resource 
Administration testified before a House of Representatives subcommittee in 1988
For example the United States can produce all types of medium range artillery shells Our ultra 
long range rounds for which the military has a very low relative requirement are of older design and no 
longer considered state of the art Several NATO European rounds have more sophisticated production 
capabilities The establishment of a US production capability for this limited need would not only 
involve substantial capital costs but also an extensive and unnecessary R&D investment
He further stipulates the central effect is simple it would lead to increased costs of ammunition in a 
period of scarce resources In Richard s mind not only does it make better fiscal sense but also it enhances 
NATO standardization and interoperability when DOD procures the ultra long range artillery shells from 
European allies 25
In alluding to enhancement of NATO standardization and interoperability during his 1988 testimony Mr 
Richards introduced a final important benefit of procuring weapons components from overseas—a spint of 
international cooperation A repon published by the Air Force Association and the United States Naval Institute 
Military Database the same year expounds This nation does not envision a single handed defense of either the 
European or Pacific theaters of operation In any such conflict it is committed to fighting alongside its allies 
A reasonable degree of mterdependence and interoperability is logical under those circumstances 26
Thus procurement from foreign sources clearly plays a strategic role in establishing [or enhancing] ties 
between the United States and other countnes 27 Pursuant to its strategic interests the United States has 
negotiated a senes of nineteen bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with foreign governments
22 Libicki Industrial Strength Defense 101
23 Blackwell Deterrence in Decay 47
24 Tim Camngton Vital Parts Military s Dependence on Foreign Suppliers Causes Rising Concern The Wall Street Journal 
24 March 1988 17
25 Testimony of John A Richards US Congress House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Defense Production 
Act Amendments o f 1988 HR 4037 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization 100th Congress second 
session 30 and 31 March 1988 (Washington DC US Government Printing Office 1988 Serial No 100 56) 97 98
26 Correli Lifeline m Danger 79
27 Virginia C Lopez and Loren Yager The US Aerospace Industry and the Trend Toward Internationalization (Washington DC 
Aerospace Industries Association of America Inc March 1988) 61
6establishing reciprocity in defense procurement matters28 With each MOU the US strategy of coalition 
defense has been backed up by coaliuon research development production procurement and follow on 
support according to James M Compton [then] acting undersecretary of defense for industrial and international 
programs 29
In a broad sense such interdependence tends to strengthen the alliance itself because it raises the costs for 
an ally that would choose to withdraw from the alliance 30 More narrowly this cooperation helps nations 
within NATO avoid procurements which re invent the wheel The Umted States for instance evaluated 
thirty two foreign items (mostly European) in 1989 for this purpose31
Even more specifically previously established cooperative mechanisms between the United States and its 
allies enabled quick procurement during the mobilization penod prior to the Gulf War Several examples have 
already been mentioned concerning rushed component procurement for accelerating or surging production of 
weapon systems These cooperative networks also enabled immediate bolstering of US capabilities m the Gulf 
by using foreign sources to work around known US weaknesses while preparing for war Foreign flagged 
vessels were chartered to transport equipment to the Gulf as part of the massive sealift and mobilization effort 
More than half of the ships (175 out of 330) used in this effort were foreign flagged32
Several other examples were reported throughout the Gulf crisis and war Though never used during the 
war purchase of two dozen Have Nap missiles from Israel would have enabled B 52 bombers to perform in a 
standoff role using conventional munitions33 Sixty Fuchs tanks were also procured from Germany to enable 
early and remote sensing of the initiation of chemical warfare by the Iraqis In addition the United States 
obtained more than one thousand other vehicles from Germany as part of its burden sharing effort Many of 
these vehicles m fact had been part of the East German military force structure prior to the unification and had 
been manufactured m East Germany Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union' Examples of vehicles obtained from 
Germany included Mercedes military ambulances five ton trucks fuel tankers water tankers Soviet made Ural 
trucks construction equipment, loading and off loading vehicles and heavy duty Czech made transporters for 
pulling tanks34 These tank transporters (approximately two hundred) played an especially important part in the 
fast paced flanking movement that outsmarted the Iraqis at the beginning of the ground war in February 1991 35 
Thus a cooperative interdependent network with its allies certainly paid off for the United States during the 
Gulf crisis
28 Ten of the nineteen MOUs are with industrialized NATO partners They define general and reciprocal policies affecting 
research and development production procurement and logistic support These ten participants include the United 
Kingdom (MOU established m 1975) France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway and Portugal (each established MOUs 
with the Umted States m 1978) Belgium (1979) Denmark (1980) and Luxembourg (1982) Three other MOUs were 
established with less industrialized NATO partners—Turkey m 1980 Spam in 1982 and Greece m 1986 These agreements 
defined general and reciprocal terms for defense industnal cooperation. Six other agreements covered terms for defense 
procurement or for defense industrial cooperation depending on the ally a codevelopment agreement with Canada began in 
1963 an industrial participation agreement has been in effect since 1973 with Australia general and reciprocal procurement 
MOUs were signed with Israel and Sweden in 1987 and with Switzerland and Egypt in 1988 The Impact of Buy American 
Restrictions Affecting Defense Procurement A Report to the Umted States Congress by the Secretary of ¡Defense (July 
1989) 23
29 Richard G O Lone, “Cooperation Essential But Difficult When Tapping Defense Market Aviation Week and Space 
Technology 132 (12 February 1990) 95
30 US Congress Office of Technology Assessment The Defense Technology Base Introduction and Overview—A Special 
Report (Washington DC US Government Printing Office March 1988 Señal No OTA ISC 374) 41
31 Martyn Bittleston Cooperation or Competition7 Def nee Procurement Options for the 1990s Adelpht Paper No 250 
(Oxford Great Bntain International Institute for Strategic Studies Nuffield Press Ltd Spring 1990) 61
32 William P Coughlin Snafus Successes Descnbed m Call up of Reserve Fleet Boston Globe 15 April 1991 9 Another
newspaper reported that the US had even decided to purchase some of the roll on roll off ships it had been chartering from
foreign owners Bruce Vail Military Learned Big Lessons in Persian Gulf Sealift Journal o f Commerce (22 February 1991) 
12B
33 Casey Anderson Iraq Counterstrike May Use B 52s Officials Say Air Force Tunes (1 October 1990) 25 and US B 52Gs 
Could Get Have Nap Missiles Soon Air Force Tunes (15 October 1990) 12
34 David Marsh Germany Supplies US with 1 000 Vehicles London Financial Tunes 21 January 1991 3
35 Associated Press report. Champaign Urbana News Gazette 28 February 1991 A9
Vulnerability Cause for Concern
Though beneficial in many respects procuring from foreign sources has its detrimental aspects too There is 
cause for concern that foreign procurement entails significant risk Every time the United States uses a foreign 
component m one of its weapon systems it exposes itself to potential vulnerability—supply cutoff delay of 
delivery and foreign interference in its affairs
Vulnerability is undemably a consequence of procuring foreign components for use m DOD weapon 
systems In simple terms vulnerability is the inability of a nation to obtain what is needed for its military 
forces on a timely basis36 Whenever DOD procures components even from domestic sources there is nsk that 
a supplier will default on its obligations The nsk however increases when the supplier is based in a foreign 
nation not subject to US laws and moreover subject to the laws of another government37
One potential vulnerability is cutoff of components by a supplying nation or manufacturer especially 
dunng contingency situations If the United States cannot obtain components needed to produce a weapon 
system then it either must do without come up with alternative suppliers or find suitable substitutes for the 
component Without preplanning for such a situation there is potential for a crisis m force capabilities For 
instance m the event of complete foreign cutoff it would take more than one year for domestic sources to 
produce the silicon or gallium arsenide field effect transistors used m high frequency radars common to most 
PGMs38 If the cutoff occurred dunng war the United States would quite possibly lack sufficient quantities of 
PGMs after initial stockpiles were depleted (somewhere between three and six months after war is initiated 
according to news accounts pnor to the Gulf War) until domestic production was enabled A cutoff would force 
greater utilization of dumb bombs and other less capable military hardware as a substitute for lost capabilities 
under such circumstances the likelihood that US and noncombatant casualties could be kept to a minimum 
diminishes greatly39
To date the United States has never suffered the consequences of foreign supplier cutoff either in peacetime 
or war but plausible cutoff scenarios have been speculated One potential scenano simply posits disagreement 
by the foreign supplier with US policy When testifying before a House of Representatives subcommittee 
Amencan Gear Manufacturers Association Executive Director Richard B Norment related the story of the USS 
Iowa heading for its battle station m preparation for the US bombing raid on Libya m 1986 A gear used in the 
steenng mechanism of the ship he said broke on the way to the battle station causing it to turn about four 
degrees to port out in the middle of the Atlantic constantly While a replacement gear was found within the 
United States enablmg correction m seventy two hours Norment speculated that the outcome would have been 
different had it been necessary to procure the gear from France one of the few world suppliers of gears left as the 
United States is losing its manufacturing capabilities in this area One might recall that France m opposing
36 More detailed and technical definitions have been offered by other authors Libicki Nunn and Taylor for instance define 
vulnerability as “Any source of supply manufacture or technology outside the Umted States or Canada for which there is no 
immediately available alternative source within the United States or Canada and whose lack of reliability and substitutability 
jeopardizes national security by precluding the production or significantly reducing the capability of a critical weapon 
system US Industrial Base Dependence/Vulnerabihty Phase II—Analysts p 4 A related term dependency is defined in a 
1986 Joint Logistics Command report as an immediate senous logistics support problem that affects the combat capability 
of the Umted States because of the unavailability of a foreign sourced item The report is classified however this definition 
was cited in US Congress House Defense Production Act Amendments o f 1990 Report o f the Committee on Banking 
Finance and Urban Affairs to Accompany HR 486 101st Congress second session 19 September 1990 (Washington DC 
US Government Printing Office 1990 Serial No 101 724) 24
37 Traditionally domestic suppliers have been subject to the rules of the Defense Production Act of 1950 Among this act s 
many provisions is authority for DOD to force suppliers to prioritize production for military contracts especially in time of 
cnsis Congress failed to renew this act m 1990 due to the lack of ideological consensus on other new provisions however 
the Bush Administration still enforced its authonty over domestic suppliers dunng the Gulf War through an Executive Order
38 Libicki Industruil Strength Defense 82 83 and 94
39 A recent report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff depicted other potential impacts of cutoff If foreign sources were unavailable in 
cnses it reported the M 1 tank AIM 7 missile sonobuoys and the F/A 18 Hornet could commue production for only two 
months while it would take six to fourteen months for US sources to supply industnes with components necessary to resume 
production Automated and multifunction machine tools precision ball bearings computer chips and precision optics 
procured from foreign sources were labeled as potential show stoppers New JCS Document Warns of Senous Erosion in 
Aircraft Subcontractor Base Inside the Air Force (5 April 1991) 1
8US acüon against Libya did not allow over flight for US bombers during the raid and thus there was a 
possibility that France also would have denied needed components for US weapon systems 40
Several other potential cutoff scenarios have been offered Problems such as strikes political unrest or 
natural disasters within the supplier s country are all plausible Cutoffs might also be created by the supplying 
nation giving priority to ventures more profitable than DOD contracts or giving priority to the supplier s home 
country needs over the United States especially m times of crisis Countries external to the supplying country 
could also create cutoffs—by threatening the supplier by an overt blockade or by war One US study done 
prior to the end of the Cold War reminded readers that Japan was within easy bombing distance of the Soviet 
Union and thus the USSR could easily cut off critical components for US weapon systems 41 Although the 
political climate for the near term makes this specific scenano unlikely recent Soviet military activity 
demonstrates that the possibility remains The USSR test fired two sea launched ballistic missiles into the Sea 
of Japan at a time coinciding with Mikhail Gorbachev s April 1991 visit to Japan Some analysts descnbed the 
test finngs as a muscle flex and a political message for Tokyo ”42 The message however has ramifications 
for the United States also—sources of certain cntical supplies are vulnerable to hostility a situation that creates 
a possible domino effect on US weapon systems
Another potential nsk is delay m delivery of needed components One defense supplier in fact, claims that 
we have already been harmed by this vulnerability to a mmor extent Cray Research Inc a Minneapolis based 
firm leads the world in supercomputer technology but it is dependent on Japanese suppliers for many high 
speed logic and memory chips Jerry Brost Cray s vice president for engineering says We have seen cases 
where we haven t received the parts [from the overseas suppliers] when we needed them 43 Although a 
problem the damage to national security was negligible in this peacetime case it merely hampered Cray s 
ability to deliver its end products in accordance with its contracts Such delays however could have had 
security implications if they had occurred during the Gulf War
Despite the successes of US military weapon systems that used foreign high technology components during 
the Gulf War there were moments of uncertainty as to whether the United States would be able to get requested 
rush orders filled for needed components on a timely basis Reporter Stuart Auerbach recently reported m the 
Washington Post that on nearly thirty occasions the Bush administration had to call upon foreign governments 
for help to get delivery of crucial parts for the war effort Auerbach continued foreign manufacturers often 
were reluctant to put die Pentagon s purchase orders ahead of their regular customers without prompting from 
their governments according to officials at embassies here and at the Commerce Department 44
Of special concern were Japanese suppliers According to John Eckhouse an investigative reporter for the 
San Francisco Chronicle The Japanese electronics companies—whose identities have not been publicly 
disclosed—reportedly said they could not curtail existing commercial contracts such as orders from VCR 
television and automobile manufacturers to meet the needs of the US forces m the Gulf Experts on Japan 
according to Mr Eckhouse also speculated that Japanese suppliers in a society geared toward avoiding any 
military involvement beyond national borders in the post World War II era may have been afraid of domestic 
political ramifications of favoring military over commercial customers Mr Eckhouse s interview with an 
unnamed Commerce Department official revealed that the US government had to jump through the hoops and 
that the department took the unusual step of asking Japanese government officials at the embassy in 
Washington for help in prodding Japanese suppliers 145
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Specific components were not revealed to Eckhouse but he reported that components were most likely to be semiconductors
If Auerbach s and Eckhouse s reports are true then the Gulf War is the first documented case of US 
vulnerability to foreign suppliers during a wartime situation It is important to note however that while the 
potential vulnerability was real the reports also revealed successful resolution of the problems Government to 
government intervention successfully shifted suppliers priorities towards the war effort The unnamed 
Commerce Department official interviewed by Eckhouse insisted that it would be an overstatement to call the 
incident a crisis While it is the first time that our growing dependence on certain critical components was 
spotlighted m a  war setting we were able to resolve the challenge successfully he said We were lucky we 
were dealing with allies *46
The remarks of this unnamed Commerce Department official deserve some critical analysis This official 
was correct to emphasize that crisis was averted, smce the United States obtained the components needed on a 
timely basis The potential for crisis however certainly existed and only a common political objective shared 
by top levels of the US and foreign governments averted more senous problems The bond between most 
governments during the war was created by nearly unanimous outrage over Iraq s aggression such a bond was 
both unprecedented and delicate thus it may be tough to duplicate m the future Had there not been a common 
political objective or had the Japanese government for instance been more inclined to bow to domestic calls for 
avoidmg contributions to the war effort (and there was considerable pressure within Japan for nomnvolvement) 
it is quite likely the Umted States would have had to look for other sources to obtain necessary components 
Without pre planning for alternate supply sources the probability of a favorable resolution would have decreased 
significantly
Furthermore the mere fact that the US government requested assistance from foreign governments to obtain 
rush orders of critical supplies revealed a weakness in its defense production to outsiders who may not share our 
security concerns 47 The implication here is that foreign governments can use this demonstrated weakness as 
leverage m future dealings with the Umted States—Unking US foreign and economic policies that they desire 
with continued supply of military components
An ommous prediction of foreign interference was succinctly detailed by Japanese politician (and long time 
Diet member) Shmtaro Ishihara m The Japan That Can Say No After touting Japan s dominance m 
semiconductor manufacturing Ishihara predicted that the accuracy of guidance systems for both US and Soviet 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would be totally dependent m the future on these products of 
Japanese manufacturing prowess In Ishihara s words
In short without using new generation computer chips made in Japan the US Department of 
Defense cannot guarantee the precision of its nuclear weapons If Japan told Washington it would no 
longer sell computer chips to the United States the Pentagon would be totally helpless Furthermore 
the global mihtary balance could be completely upset if Japan decided to sell its computer chips to the 
Soviet Union instead of the Umted States 48
Ishihara may be incorrect m the details of the example he cites but his pomt is well taken In fact 
semiconductors for ICBMs are not produced in Japan—they are produced within the Umted States due to the 
necessity of guaranteeing shielding against radiation and the electro magnetic pulse 49 something Japanese 
manufacturers do not design into their chips But because an estimated 90 percent of the semiconductors used
and batteries Auerbach related one specific instance US government officials asking the Japanese embassy for help 
obtaining parts that were m short supply for producing a video display terminal used in the Gulf
46 Eckhouse 1
47 Stephen B Bryan a former deputy undersecretary of defense quoted by Auerbach US Relied on Foreign Made Parts for 
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within the US military come from the Far East especially Japan 50 the United States is becoming quite 
vulnerable to Japanese leverage as Mr Ishihara implies
By using their leverage as suppliers for critical components of US weapon systems Japan or other nations 
could hamper the United States in producing or using weapons it deems necessary The United States may find 
itself making decisions about new weapons based on foreign research and development foreign parts and 
knowledge that foreigners are willing to share Furthermore the ability of the United States to engage in 
sustained war would be dependent on continuous support from foreign suppliers If a supplying nation loses 
interest in the war or is convmced that continued supply to the United States is detrimental to its own interests 
availability of future components would be threatened In addition the decision by a foreign country to provide 
its best technology might be conditional on a favorable decision by the United States m another area of foreign 
or economic policy51 To date the United States has yet to encounter such situations but a recent threat by a 
high ranking Japanese official has ominous overtones about such linkage Japan s minister of finance Makoto 
Utsumi was reported to have threatened to curb credit to the Umted States if Congress passed a bill imposing 
restrictions on Japanese banks and security firms This was the first time that Japan had openly threatened to 
use its ownership of American debt to influence American policy It does not take a great leap of logic to infer 
that Japan could just as easily threaten cutoff of military components m the future Ultimately the issue of 
potential foreign interference boils down to a question often asked m today s interdependent and competitive 
world who will set the agenda for the Umted States—politically militarily and economically9 For the 
United States this is becoming a serious question
The preceding discussion about crisis and the potential for foreign interference demonstrates that a large part 
of this concern is not about nations considered to be US enemies but instead about nations that are allies of 
the Umted States Nations that have traditionally been our strongest political allies and sources of 
interdependence (members of NATO Japan and Canada) have also grown to become our biggest economic 
competitors Some nations especially Japan have shown willingness to use economic clout as leverage 
against the United States
In addition both the United States and its allies have demonstrated diverging political interests on many 
occasions and each has used whatever leverage it had available to show the other displeasure or to attempt to 
persuade the other to change its policy The Europeans have on occasion shown displeasure with US policies 
by refusing landing or overflight rights for US aircraft Most European nations refused landing privileges to US 
planes involved m supply efforts during the Arab Israeli war of 1973 The refusal by France to allow overflight 
during the 1986 bombing raid of Libya has already been mentioned The United States for its part has 
threatened and actually cut off critical supplies from European allies on several occasions One example is the 
US threat during the crisis of 1956 to cut off oil supplies to the British and the French if they did not remove 
their military forces from the Suez Canal region From 1964 to 1966 the United States denied France computer 
technology in order to inhibit Charles DeGaulle s force de frappe and to force work on France s hydrogen 
bomb to stop Finally to express displeasure with repressive Soviet policies in Poland m the early 1980s the 
United States retroactively canceled technology licensing agreements with European nations m an attempt to 
prevent European help for the construction of the Soviet European gas pipeline52
These examples remind one of the often quoted phrase by Henry John Temple Lord Palmerston (1784 
1865) Nations do not have permanent enemies nor do they have permanent friends They have only 
permanent interests ** After paraphrasing this very thought when he testified about the potential vulnerability of 
the United States caused by procurement from allies former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 
Thomas H Moorer USN added And if we get involved in some kind of altercation or confrontation which is
50 Roderick L Vawter US Industrial Base Dependence/Vulnerabihty Phase I—Survey o f Literature (Washington DC National 
Defense University Mobilization Concepts Development Center Institute for National Strategic Studies December
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contrary to the national interest of any of these nations they will stop production 53 In this respect the 
previously mentioned unnamed Commerce Department official was incorrect in assessing the avoidance of crisis 
during the Gulf War as lucky we were dealing with allies In fact we were lucky that we were dealing with 
allies that had compatible political objectives While procurement from allies doesn t entail as much nsk as it 
would from other countries the fact remains that the nsk is considerable
Compounding Vulnerability
It is apparent that the nsk of vulnerability is compounded by other factors One factor is a lack of knowledge 
about the true extent of foreign sourcing This factor precludes well planned responses to existing 
vulnerabilities A second factor the dwindling manufacturing base in the United States increases the likelihood 
that the vulnerabilities of foreign procurement will be perpetuated and probably continue to increase Thus 
focusing on reducing existing vulnerabilities is beneficial to some extent but it is not a long term solution 
Third an internally inconsistent collection of uncoordinated government agencies and disjointed policies 
fostered by free market ideology m the Umted States hampers effective management and reduction of these 
vulnerabilities Each of these factors requires detailed analysis
While this paper has used numerous examples to depict the pervasive use of foreign components in US 
weapon systems knowledge of its true extent is lacking A 1988 Department of Defense (DOD) report stated 
•While this issue has been studied extensively on an ad hoc basis and anecdotal evidence abounds there are few 
even moderately comprehensive studies of foreign sourced components of key weapon systems 54 The 1989 
CSIS study mentioned previously concluded that although the trend towards foreign procurement of microchips 
is well known there is reason to be troubled by the lack of adequate data and analysis of other products and 
sectors which may conceal significant vulnerabilities lurking beyond view 55 In an attempt to foster analysis 
and decision making DOD has been assembling a broad database since 1985 Named The Defense Industrial 
Network (DINET) it contains information about the components suppliers and manufacturers used to produce 
DOD weapon systems procured from 1986 to the present DINET has a variety of purposes—among them is to 
identify specific components procured from foreign sources and provide information about potential alternative 
suppliers
This database however has been widely criticized as not being comprehensive Criticism focuses on limits 
imposed on data collection Data contained within the system includes only items for which DOD made direct 
purchases (components contracted specifically to DOD) but does not include those purchased by contractors to 
DOD Purchases tracked do not include contracts of less than $25 000 nor does the database include purchases 
off the shelf —those purchases made without formal contracting or specification processes
This means that there is no information within the database about a whole realm of suppliers either foreign 
or domestic that under subcontract provide components to a prime contractor who m turn has a direct purchase 
contract with DOD In modem weapons systems prime contractors are merely system integrators It is not 
uncommon for them to subcontract 60 to 70 percent of their overall production work through a network of 
manufacturers that could be ten to fifteen tiers deep156 Thus any picture obtained from examining the existing 
DINET database is incomplete Larry Grossman associate editor of Military Forum probably summed it best 
when he wrote DOD knows which companies arc building its tanks fighter aircraft, and submarines but it has 
less insight mto the origin of what is under the hood That is because the military does little to monitor the 
activities of sub-tier contractors 57
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Without data pertaining to all levels of supply and production of a weapon system it is likely that many 
potential or existing vulnerabilities are unknown If such vulnerabilities are exposed by surprise especially in 
time of war then the potential for crisis exists A complete database would enable identification of 
vulnerabilities prior to the crisis stage as well as allow a proactive response
A second factor compounding vulnerability is the dwindling US manufactunng base58 CSIS reported that 
the number of firms that provided goods to DOD shrunk between 1982 and 1987 from more than 118 000 to 
less than 40 000 For some products it continued there was no longer more than one domestic supplier 
Examples given mcluded certain depth charge components parachute recovery systems some specialized manne 
vessels tanks a number of types of machinery nonmetalhc pipe and piezoelectnc crystals The only domestic 
source of certain matenals for missiles had to be bailed out” with federal funding according to James Blackwell 
project director for the CSIS study59
In its annual assessment of the nation s capabilities the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1991 reported further 
dwindling of the manufactunng base Only one supplier remains for aircraft titanium extrusions optic coatings 
and image converter tubes and only two or three suppliers exist for sixteen other components Production 
capability m essential sub her mdustnes such as machine tools gears optics beanngs castings and forgings 
has also declined60 As a warning of the potential implications of such a dwindling domestic base the JCS 
wrote The loss of sub tier suppliers—manufacturers of subsystem components of larger systems—is a threat 
to our ability to field state of the art weapon systems on a timely basis 61
Not stated but implied in the JCS warning is that dwindling manufactunng capabilities increases the 
likelihood that foreign procurement and its associated vulnerabilities are perpetuated A hypothetical example by 
Robert Kurtz illustrates the point Kurtz chairman of a National Research Council study group commissioned 
by the army to study US mdustnal preparedness m 1990 wrote
Suppose for example that a modem Rosie [the Riveter] was asked to design a microchip for an 
aircraft guidance system She might find it difficult if not impossible to locate a domestic company 
with the equipment to convert her design into an actual product Many companies lack the 
sophisticated machinery needed to produce modem weapons 62
While US firms may have the technological know how the Japanese have the mass production and 
quality control capability with respect to electronics and semiconductors 63 Today US firms are often left with 
little choice but to procure components from overseas sources rather than mvest huge sums of money and many 
years of research and development to achieve the capabilities that other nation s firms already have Foreign 
components are typically mexpensive and of high quality a combination that offers strong incentives to buy 
abroad
A 1988 DOD report expounds upon further consequences of a particularly disconcerting trend the decime of 
the machine tool industry
The decline of manufactunng equipment mdustnes is of particular concern to the Department of 
Defense As long as state-of the art production equipment is manufactured m the United States there is 
a substantial capability to reconstitute or expand Amencan product mdustnes However without the 
basic tools for manufactunng this capability virtually disappears leavmg Umted States secunty 
vulnerable to the political and economic processes of other nations 64
58 Actually it is the combination of a dwindling manufactunng and technology base The dwindling technology base however 
has already been discussed in the text.
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If the United States not only procures critical components from other nations but also cannot produce the 
components even if it wanted to it is certainly more susceptible to foreign pressure than if it had prospective 
domestic suppliers A dwindling manufacturing base therefore increases the likelihood that US vulnerabilities 
will multiply m the long term Clearly any successful plan to reduce the vulnerabilities created by foreign 
procurement requires a long range dual approach—focusing upon improvements to US manufacturing 
capabilities as well as mitigation of existing vulnerabilities
The third and final factor that compounds vulnerability is inconsistency within the US government The 
industrial base that supplies components to DOD is not an entity separate from the commercial industrial base 
indeed the distinction between military and commercial technologies is steadily diminishing DOD will 
therefore not be able to reduce long term vulnerabilities created by diminished manufacturing without the joint 
efforts of numerous other federal government agencies and private firms Unfortunately the current lack of 
coordinated efforts as well as disjointed policies within the US government inhibit the identification of long 
term solutions
The term defense industrial base is m many respects a misnomer It implies that there is an industry 
supplying only DOD completely separate from the commercial realm The feet is however that while there are 
firms for which DOD is the only or biggest customer there are also many that supply to DOD as one of 
numerous customers According to an industrial base study by the General Accounting Office DOD s 
suppliers
manufacture both defense and non defense products Activities of the firms range from 
assemblmg major weapon systems (such as tanks and missiles) to supplying small parts (such as 
washers screws and clamps) to machining already manufactured parts 65 Congress Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) agrees DOD is a small and relatively insignificant customer when 
compared to aggregate consumer demand m most high technology civilian based industries 66
Department of Commerce official John A Richards further expounded during 1988 testimony before 
Congress Defense production of most firms within the industrial base comprises less than 10 percent of their 
business In order to maintain their ability to continue to produce defense items most companies must be able 
to compete in the commercial sector which accounts for the overwhelming majority of orders He further 
tesufied that the Department of Commerce and DOD had cooperated previously to make a list of sixty industries 
critical to national security The process of making such a list, however became extremely difficult because 
only a handful of industries don t have a role in supporting or supplying DOD Our industrial base is 
not a separate defense industrial base and non defense industrial base was Mr Richard s conclusion 67
The lack of distinction between military and commercial industries is also applicable to technologies The 
task of separating technologies that are uniquely military and civilian m fact is extremely difficult What the 
military calls brilliant guidance is a subspecies of precision navigation and precision navigation technologies 
are used in commercial products according to the OTA 68 There are food chain linkages 69 meaning that few 
technologies are developed m isolation Brilliant guidance for instance feeds upon computers sophisticated 
microchips sensors mappmg systems and inertial guidance technologies Furthermore recent listings of 
critical commercial technologies by the mdependent Council on Competitiveness as well as the White House 
Critical Technologies Panel of the Office of Science and Technology Policy mcluded many items that were on
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DOD s critical technologies h s t70 Critical technologies m the United States thus have a dual use nature 
applicable to both military security and commercial prosperity
These inexorable linkages—between military and commercial technologies as well as between military and 
commercial industries—mean that DOD by itself is incapable of preventing growing vulnerabilities caused by 
the dwindling of US industry Only a coordinated and joint effort between DOD other government agencies 
and commercial industry can do the job Unfortunately the current lack of a coordinated effort precludes making 
progress m reducing vulnerability
Absent within the US government are institutions capable of dealing with complex technological [or 
industrial] issues that have both commercial and military implications and that cut across several industries 71 
Twenty six government agencies are responsible for industrial preparedness planning but there is no real 
champion” within for industrial matters The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates 
preparedness planning for natural and man made disasters (war) but it has neither the resources nor the authority 
to be effective in this mission—it can convene meetings but not compel attendance force decisions or enforce 
recommendations 72
With respect to technology the one organization that provides an overview of federal research and other 
activities related to economic performance is the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP) ** according to retired Admiral B R Inman and Daniel F Burton Jr active participants m various 
councils that propose recommendations for revitalizing industrial competitiveness OSTP helps to coordinate 
federal research and development (R&D) but like FEMA it has no line functions and operates on a small 
budget and staff on loan from other agencies Civilian R&D is dispersed among twelve agencies in the 
executive branch and thirteen appropriations subcommittees for science in the legislative branch In a manner 
analogous to civilian R&D military R&D is dispersed among the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) and numerous service laboratories And while DARPA is one of the most highly respected research 
agencies within the US government it has little coordination with civilian agencies although half of its budget 
is invested in dual use technologies In effect there are many agencies responsible for fostenng technology 
within the US government each going off m its own direction with R&D or policies that affect other agencies 
and there is no mechanism for establishing reasonable compromises or setting priorities73
The lack of coordination that exists between government agencies also exists between government and 
industry DOD s relationship with its subcontractor base is an example The Pentagon fails to encourage 
vendor s participation m strategic planning decisions or design processes despite the fact that purchased 
matenals and components supplied by subcontractors represent 50 to 85 percent of the total cost Instead 
requirements for free and open pnce competition combined with program stretch outs and uncertain defense 
budgets have the effect of keeping the supplier base in constant turmoil and make it virtually impossible 
to build a stable base of reliable high quality cost effective vendors ’74
Further hampenng a coordinated effort in reducing long term vulnerabilities is a vanety of mconsistent 
policies Policies affecting the industnal and technology base as well as procurement from overseas sources
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have been developed in a case by case approach with no real priorities or strategy applied 75 Certain existing 
policies in fact, were demonstrated by DOD researcher Roderick Vawter to be responsible for the pervasive 
nature of foreign procurement Procurement officers he wrote m 1986 have long been attuned to the necessity 
of having a prosperous domestic industrial and technology base to ensure delivery of needed components on a 
timely basis especially m emergency situations These same procurement officers however have been 
confronted with competition and NATO standardization policies which opened up bidding for defense contracts 
to other nations In many cases foreign firms outbid US firms and thus contracts were awarded overseas to the 
detriment of the domestic industrial base 76
There are also policy conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of government m the area of 
foreign procurement Approximately twenty three congressional mandated buy American provisions exist m 
current statutes 77 DOD complies with each of these laws but waiver authority granted within certain of these 
laws stall permits foreign procurement To comply with the broad Buy American Act of 1933 for instance 
DOD adds 50 percent to the pnce bid by overseas firms thus fostering advantage for domestic bidders At the 
same time however for most contract awards DOD waivers this act in support of reciprocity arrangements m 
defense procurement established by mneteen memoranda of understanding with US allies 78
Other existing government laws and policies discourage production or make it noncompetitive to produce m 
the United States An incomplete listing includes
Some rocket motor chemicals for example can t be produced within the United States because of 
environmental regulations 79
US Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) standards while important m providing a safe 
work environment have nevertheless increased costs of production and ultimately the pnce of products
Anti trust restnctions within the United States have discouraged cooperative ventures between 
companies though such ventures have been successful in fostenng industry m other nations
Military specifications (MILSPECs) for product content and performance are overstated m the 
minds of many manufacturers—m the PGM study suppliers responding to a survey felt MILSPEC 
increase costs and may even result in lower quality than is available commercially80
Product liability laws necessitate extensive tests and evaluation to protect manufacturers against 
costly lawsuits m the United States
Current US tax policies provide a lack of incentive for investment in new equipment plants and 
technology
The above are all nonproducuve costs that increase the pnce of US products and create burdens on US 
manufacturers often not encountered by foreign suppliers Combined these laws and policies constitute a de 
facto industrial policy that is at best incoherent and at worst counterproductive 81
The term industrial policy conjures intense debate within the United States While some defense analysts 
such as Robert Costello and Jacques Gansler claim such policy already exists82 officially there is none 
Generally taken to mean that the government provides incentives to enhance strategically chosen industries—m 
effect, picking winners and losers—industrial policy is something that advocates of free market economics argue 
the government is ill prepared to do According to free market advocates the government should interfere with
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the market and industry as little as possible and only when absolutely necessary They believe market forces 
will distribute the right mix of resources both in the United States and around the world Proponents offer the 
sustained prosperity of the United States since World War II as evidence of the success of free markets Free 
market advocates currently occupy most key policy making positions within the executive branch of the US 
government
Unfortunately continuing allegiance by the United States to free market ideology may be illogical m 
today s world83 Other countries especially Japan Korea and Southeast Asian nations such as Taiwan Hong 
Kong and Singapore and also some European nations including Germany have forged ahead economically 
without fostering free markets Most of these nations America s biggest economic competitors have no 
qualms about picking winners and losers Naohiro Amaya former Japanese vice minister for international 
affairs m the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) explained Japan s philosophy When you go 
hunting you have to shoot at a target But your neoclassical school of economics says you can fire m all 
directions at once and the market will ensure you hit the target Well we don t accept that Ime of 
reasoning ”84
Strategic industries m these nations are frequently subsidized by the government m both labor and 
development costs Unlike the United States responsibility for industrial and technology policies are centralized 
(rather than separated) into a ministry of science and technology or trade and industry85 In each of these 
countries placing broad responsibilities m one agency has fostered coordinated consistent and successful efforts 
to make their industries competitive m world markets Evidence of their successes are everywhere as they have 
gained huge market shares of industries once dominated by the United States semiconductors machine tools 
gears optics bearings castings forgings etc These are precisely the industries where concern exists about the 
vulnerability introduced by foreign procurement of components for US military weapons systems
By clinging to simple mmded free market ideology and allowing uncoordinated agencies and inconsistent 
policies to prevail the US government has fostered industrial losers rather than enhancing strategic winners As 
argued in the CSIS report, plans to let the market play itself out could foster further dwindling of the 
industrial base as the economy shifts toward a service economy *Without government intervention the defense 
market will not produce the right mix of material needed for national security For this reason the government 
cannot simply take a complete hands-off approach 86 In testimony before a House subcommittee in 1989 
Anthony H Hamgan President, US Business and Industrial Council added the market doesn t have any 
appreciation of strategic factors A company has no requirement to consider the national interest m its 
production it has to especially today in terms of profit calculations on the short term look only at the bottom 
Ime 87 As the dwindling of our nation s critical industries has shown the bottom line all too often has been 
oblivious to the vulnerabilities created by foreign procurement
Policy Recommendations
What policy direction should the United States take to respond to the current trends and implications of foreign 
procurement9 Many of the trends and implications described m this paper are negative from a US perspective 
Foreign procurement potentially renders the United States vulnerable to exploitation by other governments and 
this vulnerability is compounded by lack of knowledge about its extent the dwindling manufacturing base 
uncoordinated agencies inconsistent policies and the strategic indifference of a free market economy Due to 
these negative implications policy makers within DOD and the US government cannot allow foreign 
procurement to proceed unmitigated One policy option to combat these negative effects would simply be to
83 This theme is developed with painstaking detail in Robert Kuttner s The End o f Laissez Fave National Purpose and the 
Global Economy After the Cold War (New York Alfred A Knopf 1991)
84 Steven Schlossstein The End o f the American Century (New York Congdon and Weed Inc 1989) 34
85 Inman and Burton Technology and Competitiveness The New Policy Fronuer 130
86 Blackwell Deterrence in Decay 3 58
87 Testimony US Congress House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Defense Production Act Amendments o f  
1989 HR 486 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization 101st Congress first session 17 18 24 
May and 20 June 1989 (Washington DC US Government Pnntmg Office 1989 Señal No 101 27) 18
prohibit foreign procurement (or at least limit it to the maximum extent practical)88 But such policy would be 
ignorant of an essential benefit of foreign procurement
Although a policy prohibiung foreign procurement would eliminate the vulnerabilities created by supply 
cutoff or delay m delivery from overseas suppliers such a policy would also eliminate US access to the world s 
best technologies As demonstrated previously technologically superior weapons are an essential element of 
US military strategy—they enable precise overwhelming quick, and effective offensive action while at the 
same tune minimizing US and noncombatant casualties To the degree that restrictions on foreign procurement 
hmder US strategy such constraints are undesirable policy choices Restricting DOD contractor procurement of 
the highest quality most advanced semiconductors for instance hinders the strategic pursuit of precise and 
effective military capabilities by the United States In effect restricting foreign procurement is a self inflicted 
vulnerability potentially rendering the United States incapable of fielding unproved and break through 
weapons that potential adversaries might themselves procure
For this reason alone it is essential to consider balanced policy options Instead of substituting one 
vulnerability for another policy makers should focus on reducing or eliminating the vulnerabilities that 
currently exist and conditions that compound and increase the likelihood of their perpetuation An optimal 
policy needs to contain several elements
On one hand the United States must obtain greater knowledge about the true extent of the foreign 
components within DOD weapon systems The information contained within the DINET database must be 
expanded Until DINET reaches all the way to the end of the supplier and subcontractor chain the foreign 
dependencies involved for critical weapon systems and components the nation is planmng in the dark 89 
A complete database would enable specific analysis and determination of the foreign components that create the 
greatest vulnerabilities An annual survey of every supplier in the numerous tiers of the subcontractor network 
should be undertaken to obtain the needed information missmg from the database
To enable specific determination of vulnerabilities the database should allow analysts to answer three 
questions First what components supplied by foreign producers are common to multiple weapon systems9 
Cutoff or delay of components that are widely used have potentially greater impact on US force capabilities than 
those unique to one weapon system Second at what point does each overseas supplied component become 
essential for non interrupted production of the weapon system—in other words become part of the critical 
path9 If US contractors could continue producing a weapon system without a specific overseas component for 
an extended time until other sources of supply are established then the impact of cutoff or delay would be 
minimal On the other hand the impact of a cutoff could reach crisis proportions if the sudden unavailability of 
a particular foreign component quickly implied a production work stoppage
Third, and finally for each particular foreign component, are the suppliers members of a concentrated 
industry9 Theodore Moran Director of the Program m International Business Diplomacy at the School of 
Foreign Service Georgetown University has demonstrated that the threat of foreign manipulation of the Umted 
States is greatest when there is a concentration within a very few nations of external suppliers of technology 
products or inputs He advocates determining the risk of foreign manipulation by adopting a standard the 
4/50 rule of thumb which has proven useful m economic and anti trust policy The proposed rule suggests 
that when there are more than four foreign compames or four foreign nations supplying more than 50 percent 
of the world market, they will lack the ability to collude effectively even if they wish to exploit or manipulate 
recipients 190
How costly would building and analyzing such an extensive database be9 One DOD source in 1988 
estimated it would take $29 million over five years to accomplish what is needed. Offering a trade off as
88 Inclusion of such stnct and wide ranging buy American provisions in the Defense Production Act (DPA) has been the focus 
of intense debate dunng congressional subcommittee hearings since 1987 It is quite possible that Congressional failure to 
renew the DPA in 1990 was the result of a lack of consensus on this particular issue
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comparison the source equated the cost of the database with that of one F 16 Given limited budgetary 
resources and the fact that most decision makers can more readily comprehend the deterrent value of an F 16 
over that of a database this source felt that the database would likely receive inadequate funding91 The source 
was correct—a mere $2 million was allocated to the database through 199092 The lack of comprehension 
concerning the (deterrent) value of a database is unfortunate however Obtaining comprehensive data is the first 
step m pro actively combating unintended disruptions of supply and m detemng other governments from 
exploiting vulnerabilities created by US foreign procurement
Remedial action is the second necessary step to deter exploitation Two remedies—establishment of 
stockpiles and proliferation of suppliers—could offer speedy and proactive deterrence Long term deterrence 
however requires enhancement of the US manufacturing base
One short term remedy is world wide proliferation of suppliers If the analysis made possible by an 
enhanced database reveals that particular foreign suppliers are part of a non concentrated industry then it would 
be logical for DOD to request its primary contractors to disperse subcontracts among several suppliers for each 
foreign component. In this manner DOD would decrease the likelihood that one or even several foreign 
suppliers could totally disrupt continued US production of a weapon system
Though supplier proliferation decreases vulnerability it is not foolproof Suppliers might not be 
concentrated with respect to market share or nation as Moran s description implies but instead might be 
concentrated within a particular geographical region of the world. For example most of the world s 
semiconductor producers are located m the Far East, making all of them more susceptible to hostile action by 
another nation than if they were dispersed over several geographical regions Neither does supplier proliferation 
ensure that remaining suppliers have the capacity for producing the needed quantity of a particular component if 
the United States is cut off by one nation While proliferation of suppliers offers much greater protection from 
vulnerability than unmitigated uncoordinated and unknowing foreign procurement a second remedy— 
stockpiles—is also desirable
The second, admittedly a short term remedy is more foolproof By knowing which components procured 
from foreign sources are common to several weapon systems or are on the critical path of an especially 
important system DOD can require its domestic contractors to stockpile quantities of those foreign components 
sufficient to enable uninterrupted production until an alternate supply is established Cutoff or delay m delivery 
would then have little impact on the continued production of important weapon systems in the short term
Researchers of the PGM study cited earlier found that a stockpile consisting of approximately twenty items 
and costing approximately $15 million would ensure uninterrupted production of the seventeen critical missiles 
studied even if all overseas sources were cutoff These researchers were amazed that such a relatively small 
investment would preclude successful exploitation of vulnerability for an enure class of weapons93 
Unfortunately however this opuon has been neglected Since the 1987 PGM study in fact no funding has 
been allocated for PGM component stockpiles DOD should immediately disconunue this neglect As PGMs 
so-called smart bombs were proven to be essential and successful performers in the Gulf War funding for 
component stockpiles of these weapons would be an especially worthwhile and cheap insurance policy
Beyond stockpiles for PGM components however DOD should establish greater funding priority to deter 
exploitation of vulnerabilities that unpact other weapon systems Establishment of specific stockpiles and/or 
supplier proliferation policies should be based upon conclusions drawn from extended data collection and 
analysis as called for above Even if the combmed costs for such activities approaches $1 billion the total 
would be merely three tenths of one percent of the $291 billion defense budget in Fiscal Year 1992 Certainly 
a proportion of the defense budget this small is a worthwhile investment given its deterrent value
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Detemng exploitation of vulnerabilities through stockpiling and proliferating suppliers however does not 
remedy conditions within the United States that perpetuate the growing dependence on foreign suppliers 
Additional measures are required to reverse the nation s dwindling manufacturing base Such measures are of 
special importance because a strong manufactunng base is an important determinant of the nation s ability to 
produce and sustain a strong military force
Strategic industrial planning by the US government is an essential function No longer should survival of 
US industries critical to defense (or economic prosperity) be left to the strategic indifference of a free market 
No longer should an inconsistent set of government policies regulations and laws hinder the efficiency of US 
industry
A high priority task within the government should be to conduct an extensive review of policies 
regulations and laws that impact the industrial base Each must be judged on its overall enhancement of the 
industrial base Those regulations policies and laws that achieve merely a narrow purpose while hampering a 
great portion of the industrial base should be discarded reversed, or revised 94 While successful for many years 
m preventing monopolistic practices within US industry anti trust laws are now hindering the cooperative 
ventures proven successful by overseas industries Current anti trust laws are thus important candidates for 
revision Similar candidates are US tax laws especially the capital gams tax as they hinder investment m new 
manufactunng equipment A goal should be US policies regulations and laws that provide an incentive rather 
than a burden to industry95 Whenever possible US policy should provide incentive for investment, as 
investment is an important determinant of productivity Productivity enhances US industnal competitiveness 
and competitiveness is a key to having healthy leading-edge companies for DOD to buy from 96
More than providing general incentives however the United States should target specific strategic 
industries for enhancement Only strategic targeting will ensure availability of the right mix of industnal 
capabilities necessary to preclude perpetuating foreign procurement and its associated vulnerabilities free market 
economics alone will not do this Identifying specific industnal targets for enhancement could be based in part 
upon cntical technology lists already established within DOD and the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy As mentioned previously these lists are similar though there are some differences These 
separate lists should be reconciled and merged into a set of joint national industnal technology pnonties The 
existing cntical lists also currently lack companion plans demonstrating how available resources will be 
applied to reach the identified milestones and objectives 197 Lead agencies should be identified within the 
government to monitor and nurture each technology and monetary assistance should be provided as needed
Moran s 4/50 rule of thumb used m conjunction with an enhanced data base would further enable 
identification and prioritization of strategic US industries Using Moran s scheme dwindling US industries in 
areas where the sources of external supply are concentrated should be of greatest concern for US policy makers 
due to the potential for foreign manipulation These industries should be assigned high priority for US 
government assistance and protection for national security98
Enhancing US industry in order to prevent the perpetuation of foreign procurement vulnerabilities requires 
government subsidies While the term subsidy generally has negative connotations money granted to a
94 Of course it will not be desirable to discard reverse or revise all laws which hamper industrial competitiveness Despite the 
possibility that OSHA laws raise the costs of production for many US manufacturers maintenance of a safe work environment 
is essential to producers also For those laws that are inconsistent with enhancing overall competiuveness but still 
necessary there should be rules thatequitably compare foreign bids with those of US manufacturers Such mies would compare 
on a case by-case basis the impact of US and foreign laws on the bids received—in other words they would ensure that the 
bottom Ime pnce offered by a foreign competitor isn t the primary factor judged but one of many important items in 
evaluating a bid
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strategic industry by the government is m effect, an investment99 Subsidies like private investments provide 
the capital to ensure that the technologies and industry the United States needs will remain productive and 
competitive in the future The government doesn t need to fund full costs but it could establish cooperative 
funding ventures with private industry for those projects it deems strategic Already government and industry 
have cooperatively combmed to develop better manufacturing capabiliues and techniques through DOD s 
Manufacturing Technology Program Another apparently successful venture is Sematech combining monetary 
resources from DOD with a consortium of fourteen private firms to enhance semiconductor production 
techniques These consortia should be models for other cooperative ventures between government and strategic 
industries
Foreign procurement could also be incorporated within strategic planning to enhance the manufacturing 
base Rather than depending upon direct product purchases from overseas firms DOD contractors should 
attempt to license foreign technologies and to procure industrial techniques (management practices) through 
consulting and service contracts with foreign firms100 then produce needed components within the Umted 
States In this manner the United States would maintain access to the components and technologies it needs for 
its weapon systems but at the same time take steps towards reducing the conditions that foster long term 
vulnerabilities In the long term such practices might even foster greater quality pnce and technology 
competitiveness within US industry Licensing technologies and buymg mdustnal techniques are more 
expensive than buymg only components but the additional long term benefits may be worth the costs Foreign 
procurement would therefore serve a strategic purpose beyond complementing military strategy
Ultimately however unprecedented coordination m planning and policy between DOD civilian government 
agencies and commercial firms is necessary to enhance US manufacturing Several arguments presented earlier 
m this essay depicted the necessity for unity For one DOD cannot effectively enhance the manufacturing base 
on its own since most US suppliers overwhelmingly depend on commercial contracts for their livelihood At 
the same time it is unable to render effective unilateral support, DOD hampers its subcontractor suppliers by 
failing to include them m its strategic planning Further hindering effective assistance to the manufacturing 
base is the lack of a single agency within the government capable of resolving the numerous issues that affect 
government and industry
An effective agency within the US government that could champion and coordinate mdustnal affairs 
would be extremely helpful m reversing the dwindling manufactunng base in the United States Consisting of 
representatives from several government agencies as well as liaisons from outside the government, the proposed 
agency must be inspired by the military concept of jomtness Jointness is simply the unification of several 
distinct organizations with a common objective under the leadership of a single powerful individual who has 
authority to approve fiscally constrained plans and policy Application of this concept has been credited with 
enabling the US military to efficiently and successfully prosecute the war against Iraq101
A specific organizational model for such a joint agency might be an improved version of the Committee on 
Foreign Investment m the United States (CFIUS) CFIUS consists of eight cabinet level officials the 
Secretary of State Secretary of Treasury Secretary of Defense Secretary of Commerce the Assistant to the 
President for Economic Affairs Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy the 
Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget This committee investigates the 
national security implications of foreign acquisitions of US firms that supply defense materials then 
recommends whether presidential approval of each transaction is warranted102 Smce this committee already 
analyzes mdustnal matters with national secunty implications it would be a logical candidate for an expanded 
mission—setting the direction and resolving the issues that could improve the adequacy of the overall US 
industrial base from both a civilian and military perspective
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Several changes to the committee s existing structure however would enhance its jointness and its 
capability to successfully reverse the dwindling industrial base First, its membership must be expanded Added 
to its membership should be the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Policy as well as 
liaisons from industry and the scientific community to ensure key players are not left out of strategic planning 
Congressional representatives should also be mcluded for the initial sessions in order to gain consensus between 
the executive and legislative branches103
Second, the committee should have a permanent support staff—CFIUS currently has none—that would 
provide detailed policy analysis to the committee s members Each agency composing the committee would 
assign personnel to the support staff These staff members should have knowledge of industrial matters 
affecting the agencies they represent as well as a joint perspective —an attitude that enables them to work 
together toward a common objective
Finally to enforce a joint perspective the committee should be headed by an individual with clear 
presidential authority for establishing a broad policy designed to improve the industrial base Smce the top 
individuals serving on the committee are of cabinet rank a logical choice for leadership would be the Vice 
President of the United States A leader with such broad responsibility would enable the committee to look 
beyond the focused or tunneled concerns of individual agencies and instead examine proposals and develop policy 
for achieving the desired common objective
A single joint agency structured in this manner would have greater potential for reversing the decline of the 
manufacturing base than the current uncoordinated approach By virtue of its cross cutting membership it can 
develop wide ranging policies for assisting industry something that neither DOD nor any other government 
agency can do alone Some of the turmoil that currently hampers domestic suppliers would be reduced by 
including industry liaisons in strategic planning And by virtue of the clear and broad presidential authority of 
the committee s proposed leader the entire government would be more responsive to the coordinated policies 
developed
Conclusions
The policy implications of procuring foreign components for use in US military weapon systems are 
multifaceted The United States can reap several benefits from procuring components overseas and one—access 
to the world s best technologies for incorporation into technically superior weapon systems—is an essential 
component of US military strategy For strategic military reasons then policy makers should not limit 
procurement to domestic sources
Instead, policy making should focus upon taking advantage of this essential benefit while at the same firne 
working to mitigate factors that make the United States vulnerable to delay m delivery complete cutoff or 
foreign manipulation To preclude planning in the dark the Umted States must gain greater knowledge of the 
true extent to which foreign components are used m its weapon systems An expanded database containing 
information about components procured at all levels of the supplier network is essential in determining where 
vulnerability risks are greatest Risks once identified can be mitigated by proliferating suppliers and 
establishing stockpiles of critical components
To minimize the long term likelihood that foreign procurement and the vulnerabilities associated with it 
might someday become unmanageable policy must also focus upon the task of reversing the decime of the US 
industrial base Future US military capabilities are dependent on competitive domestic industries that produce 
the components DOD needs for its weapon systems Inconsistent US government policies uncoordinated
103 Unfortunately Congressional representatives cannot be permanent members of this agency due to consUtutional provisions 
for separation of powers One precedent for temporary congressional involvement however would be the budget summit 
proceedings m October 1990 where members of the executive and legislative branches joined to resolve another immense 
problem the FY91 budget After obtaining initial consensus about solutions for the industrial base Congress could then 
establish a parallel (mirror) organization within its own committee structure as its focal point for industrial affairs This 
committee can periodically meet with the proposed executive branch agency to continue hammering out consensus on future 
major issues
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agencies and the strategic indifference of a free market economy currently hinder compeuuveness in many 
industries To combat these hindrances the US government needs to engage in strategic industrial planning 
This planning should include revision of existing policies that negatively impact industry In addition strategic 
industries should be identified and government funds should be used for investment in enhanced US productivity 
m critical US industries
A viable plan for enhancing the US industrial base and mitigating the vulnerabilities represented by foreign 
procurement requires more than just DOD It requires jointness —close cooperation and coordination between 
government and industry A single joint organization including representatives from key executive branch 
agencies along with liaisons from Congress and the commercial manufacturing sector could be an effective 
mechanism for setting industrial priorities and establishing reasonable compromises currently not achievable 
within the US government Under the leadership of an individual with clear and broad presidential authority the 
committee would give policy concerning industrial affairs and future foreign procurement a clear focus In this 
manner US policy would become more responsive to the trends and needs demonstrated by the current pervasive 
procurement of foreign components for US weapon systems
Appendix
A review of the existing literature and studies reveals numerous examples of foreign components m US weapons 
systems A sampling follows
Jacques S Gansler Affording Defense (Cambridge MA MIT Press 1989)
The US defense industry is now heavily if not totally dependent on foreign sources for computer 
memory chips silicon for high powered electronic switching gallium arsenide based semiconductors 
for high speed data processing precision glass for reconnaissance satellites and other military 
equipment, liquid crystal and luminous displays and advanced fiber optics (p 271)
In 1985 the Congressional Defense Jomt Oversight Committee on Foreign Dependency looked 
into the navy s Sparrow IE air to-air missile and found that the guidance system contained integrated 
circuits and transistors from Japan a ferrite phase shifter from West Germany a memory chip 
assembled m Thailand and ball bearings made of raw matenals from various sources Inali sixteen 
foreign produced parts were identified (p 271)
Tun Carrington Vital Parts Military s Dependence on Foreign Suppliers Causes Rising Concern The Wall 
Street Journal 24 March 1988 pp 1 17
Ball bearings in US submarines aircraft, and tanks come increasingly from Europe and Asia 
Some navy ships nde at anchor on Spanish chains (p 1)
Gallium arsenide (important because it uses less power and is faster than silicon) is procured from 
Japan for use m precision guidance systems for missiles and smart bombs radar apparatus 
communications equipment and electronic countermeasure systems It is also critical for any space 
based anti missile system (p 17)
Extremely powerful magnets used in satellite components also come from Japan Future sources 
for these magnets also include Italy the Netherlands and Germany (p 17)
The Bradley Fighting Vehicle contains imported sophisticated sensors to inform the crew of 
potential threats and targets (p 17)
Martin C Libicki Industrial Strength Defense A Disquisition on Manufacturing Surge and War (Washington 
D C National Defense University Mobilization Concepts Development Center Institute for National Strategic 
Studies 1988)
Up to half of the components m test equipment modules come from overseas Test equipment is 
essential in producing weapons because they must work right the first time (p 60)
Martin Libicki Jack Nunn and Bill Taylor US Industrial Base Dependence/Vulnerability Phase II Analysis 
(Washington D C National Defense University Mobilization Concepts Development Center Institute for 
National Strategic Studies November 1987)
Researchers found numerous specific instances of overseas sourcing for US precision guided 
missiles (PGMs) in 1987 Integrated circuit parts for all PGMs were assembled in East Asia. Radar 
components in PGMs were found to contain Silicon Field Effect Transistors (FETs) and Gallium 
Arsenide FETs from Japan ferme cores from Germany and radome chemicals from Mexico Rocket 
motor cases for the Skipper HARM and Harpoon missiles were sourced from the United Kingdom (and 
Australia m the case of the Harpoon) The United Kingdom also provided copper based printed wiring 
board plating bath actuator motors and gear motors for the HARM It also produced ball screws for 
the Patriot. Australia provided extrusions for the Harpoon Switzerland produced copper preform for 
the Copperhead missile and sapphire for the Standard, Patriot Mavenck and Sidewinder missiles 
Butan triol (used m making rocket fuel mixtures) for the Standard Patriot Mavenck and Sidewinder 
came from Germany The HARM Sidewinder and Mavenck missiles contained precision optics also 
procured from Germany as well as Japan Castings for the Standard missile and the launch tube for the 
Stinger missile was produced m Israel Finally the study found that molybdenum foil for the Patnot 
came from Austria (See—Benefits of Foreign Procurement)
Testimony by Richard B Norment, Executive Director and Thomas H Lowry President, American Gear 
Manufacturers Association US Congress House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Defense 
Production Act Amendments o f 1989 (HP 486) Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic 
Stabilization 101st Congress 1st session 17 18 24 May and 20 June 1989 (Washington D C  US 
Government Printing Office 1989 Serial No 101 27)
The American Gear Manufacturers Association estimated 30 percent of the defense contracts for 
gears are awarded to foreign sources Over twenty four ships built between 1983 and 1989 were 
equipped with gear drives from German or British compames Significant portions of aircraft gearing 
are provided by Japanese and northern European sources Vehicular gearing has been coming 
increasingly from the Asian basin and the Mediterranean states (5 140)
High precision bevel gear sets for the Blackhawk and Apache helicopters come from two 
subcontractors While a US company is one of the subcontractors it gets only a minor portion of the 
business (9)
The HumVee had $40 million worth of subcontracts for gear drives They were originally 
supplied by Japanese and Spanish sources Problems in delivery led to the approach of US companies 
but DOD vacillated between American and foreign sources The sole source for the gear drives most 
recently has been Mexico (7)
Christopher D Dementi, Commander USN and Commander Geoffrey K Renard USN Navy Dependence on 
Foreign Spares—A Problem7 (Executive Research Project # S 16 Fort McNair Washington D C Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces 1987)
With respect to raw matenals the United States and DOD rely on foreign sources for over twenty 
essential minerals We are 90 percent dependent on foreign sources for manganese chromium cobalt 
and platinum commg mostly from the USSR and South Africa In addition we are 50 percent 
dependent for bauxite zmc tungsten and cadmium (3 4 6)
The navy purchases spare parts from various European sources engine parts for a search and 
rescue ship come from Great Britain Germany supplies diesel engine parts for the PHM (a patrol 
coastal missile hydrofoil ship) and hull mechanical and electrical equipment for the MHC coastal 
minesweeper are procured from Italy (6 7)
Roderick L Vawter US Industrial Base Dependence/Vulnerabihty Phase I  Survey o f Literature (Washington 
D C National Defense University Mobilization Concepts Development Center Institute for National Strategic 
Studies December 1986)
In general European nations are sources of dependency for complete systems or major 
subsystems and built up components and chemical products Chemical suits heads up displays and 
electronics assemblies come from Europe Japan and the Far East are sources of 90 percent of the 
semiconductors as well as semiconductor assemblies that DOD uses (4 6)
Ronald E Yates Japan Claims Big Role in US Weapons Success Chicago Tribune 3 February 1991
The Japanese ingenerai have been successful m penetrating not the big ucket items (planes 
tanks ships) butin providing the critical brain cells according to Graham McCarty British defense 
industry analyst Up to 80 percent of the components in some of the smart weapons used m the Gulf 
were produced by two hundred Japanese firms A recent report prepared by the American Electronics 
Association said twenty key components produced by Japanese electronics manufacturers are used in US 
weapons systems Japanese firms are the sole suppliers of seven of the twenty vital components the 
report said Japanese made technologies are m night viewing equipment, arc speed acceleration 
indicators infrared missile homing devices television tubes m aircraft cockpits microwave weapons 
control and targeting systems flat panel displays advanced radiation communications equipment 
submanne sensors and video display terminals (7 1 and 7 6)
The Japanese produce the computer chips m the Patnot missile and the Tomahawk cruise missile 
(7 1 & 7 6)
Stuart Auerbach ‘United States Relied on Foreign Made Parts for Weapons Washington Post 25 March 
1991
During the Gulf War several US defense contractors requested rush delivery from foreign 
companies for components used in military equipment. Japanese producers of semiconductors video 
display terminals (for analyzing real urne intelligence data from reconnaissance planes) and battery 
packs to power command and control computers received such requests France provided transistors for 
a Teledyne Corporation transponder for Identification of Friend or Foe uses In addition both France 
and Japan rushed electronic components for measuring and calibrating equipment Finally Great 
Britain surged production of radio gear and avionics for use m US weapon systems (1)
John T Correli ‘Lifeline in Danger Air Force Magazine 71 (November 1988)
Semiconductors from foreign sources are contained in Global Positioning Satellites the 
Integrated Underwater Surveillance System Defense Satellite Communications System Fleet Satellite 
Communications System AN 53B SSQ Sonobuoy the F 16 Fighting Falcon AM 6988 Poet Decoy 
(an expendable jammer) the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (OH 58 Kiowa) APG 63 
Airborne Radar (for the F 15 Eagle) M l Abrams Tank and the F/A 18 Hornet (76)
Defense Budget Project, Media Advisory The Saudi Arms Sale Impact on Defense Contractors 26 October 
1990
Fokker BV m the Netherlands supplies remote control systems for the Patriot Air Defense 
System (5)
Larry Grossman Industrial Base The Supplier Bottleneck Military Forum (May 1989)
A critical optic component m the Bradley Fighting Vehicle is produced by Schott, a German 
manufacturer (45)
Testimony of Kenneth Bernhardt, consultant and former President, Ordinance Division General Defense 
Corporation US Congress House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Defense Production Act 
Amendments o f 1988 (HR 4037) Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization 100th 
Congress 2nd session 30 and 31 March 1988 (Washington D C  US Government Printing Office 1988 
Serial No 100 56)
Design and manufacturing process for all tank fired anti tank weapons out of the M 1 tank 120 
millimeter came from Germany (63)
David W Baird Hyster Gulfbound Foreign Trucks Miff Umon Champaign Urbana News Gazette 11 January 
91 A 1 and A 14
Lift trucks with ten thousand pound capacity procured by the air force were bmlt in Scotland 
then shipped to the Danville Illinois Hyster Company where workers installed the uprights and counter 
weights then painted the trucks before shipment Less than one third of the value of the contract was 
represented by Danville jobs according to Terry Payne President of the Independent Lift Truck Builders 
Union
US General Accounting Office Assessing Production Capabilities and Constraints in the Defense Industrial 
Base Report to the Subcommittee on International Trade Finance and Security Economics o f the Joint 
Economic Committee 4 April 1985 (Washington D C  US Government Printing Office 1985 Serial No 
GAO/PEMD 85 3)
One TOW2 subcontractor depended wholly on foreign sources for its quartz optics some M l tank 
circuit boards were assembled m Mexico some tank hybrid circuits came from Taiwan (v )
Paula J Pettavino Could Our Shipyards Cope7 If Not Then What7 Naval War College Review XLI (Autumn 
1988)
Less than one percent of the crucial parts needed for US shipbuilding and procured from foreign 
sources are shipped on US flagships (53)
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